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Neurophenomenology, as an attempt to combine and mutually enlighten neural and
experiential descriptions of cognitive processes, has met practical difficulties which have
limited its implementation into actual research projects. The main difficulty seems to be
the disparity of the levels of description: while neurophenomenology strongly emphasizes
the micro-dynamics of experience, at the level of brief mental events with very specific
content, most neural measures have much coarser functional selectivity, because they
mix functionally heterogeneous neural processes either in space or in time. We propose a
new starting point for this neurophenomenology, based on (a) the recent development
of human intra-cerebral EEG (iEEG) research to highlight the neural micro-dynamics
of human cognition, with millimetric and millisecond precision and (b) a disciplined
access to the experiential micro-dynamics, through specific elicitation techniques. This
lays the foundation for a microcognitive science, the practical implementation of
neurophenomenology to combine the neural and experiential investigations of human
cognition at the subsecond level.
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Despite the immediate appeal of neurophenomenology, as an
attempt to combine and mutually enlighten neural and experi-
ential descriptions of cognitive processes (Varela, 1996), prac-
tical difficulties have limited its implementation into actual
research projects. In spite of some success (Lutz et al., 2002;
Petitmengin et al., 2007), an acknowledged challenge has been
to find a level of observation at which convergence is possible.
Neurophenomenology strongly emphasizes the micro-dynamics
of experience, at the level of brief mental events with very specific
content, such as visual perception or access to the meaning of a
word. However, most neural measures have much coarser func-
tional selectivity, because they mix functionally heterogeneous
neural processes either in space (i.e., scalp-level EEG) or in time
(i.e., fMRI). Such discrepancy makes it extremely difficult to even
try a correlation between neural and experiential descriptions.
In this paper, we propose a new starting point for neurophe-
nomenology, based on (a) the recent development of human
intra-cerebral EEG (iEEG) research to reveal the neural micro-
dynamics of human cognition, with millimetric and millisecond
precision and (b) a disciplined access to the experiential micro-
dynamics, through specific elicitation techniques. If a bridge is
to be built between the neural and experiential levels, it should
be done where the river is shallow, where descriptions of men-
tal processes are fine-grained on both sides. This means simple
cognitive operations, at the level of the perception-action cycle
(Fuster, 2004; Madl et al., 2011), and precise measures of their
micro-dynamics. This lays the foundation for a micro-cognitive
science: the practical implementation of neurophenomenology
to combine the neural and experiential investigations of human
cognition at the subsecond level.
ELICITING EXPERIENTIAL MICRODYNAMICS
In most cognitive “tasks” we might be involved in, whether it
is reading an article, listening to a piece of music or cooking a
cake, our attention is usually almost completely absorbed into
the content, the “what” of our activity, to the detriment of the
“how.” For example, when hearing a sound, we immediately con-
nect that sound to a possible physical cause: “It’s a blackbird
in the plum tree,” without noticing the rapid micro-operations
we realize in order to recognize that sound (Ihde, 1976/2007;
Petitmengin et al., 2009). While writing this article, my atten-
tion is absorbed in the content of the ideas I am trying to
express, but I am hardly aware of the rapid succession of inner
comments, light emotions, evaluations, and comparisons that I
realize instant after instant to find the right words and evalu-
ate their appropriateness. While reading this sentence, are you
aware of the rapid sequence of micro-operations that enable you
to go from the words to their meaning, paced by several saccadic
eye-movements each second? As the well-known experiments of
Nisbett and Wilson clearly showed, even our decision processes
largely elude our awareness (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). This
blindness to the dynamics of experience seems to affect most,
if not all our cognitive processes, from the most concrete to the
most abstract ones.
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However, recent studies show that this lack of awareness is not
a fatality. By carrying out specific mental acts, we can access our
cognitive processes and describe them with reliability and great
precision (Petitmengin et al., 2013).
The first condition to this access is to shift from a general
description to the description of a particular occurrence of the
cognitive process to be described, a singular experience which is
precisely situated in time and space.
The second condition for accessing experiential dynamics con-
sists in loosening the focus of attention on the “what” of the
process in order to let the “how” appear. For example, if a mental
image is emerging into our consciousness, we have to reori-
ent our attention from the content of the image (for example
a blooming cherry tree), toward the dynamics of appearance,
the genesis of this content: the rapid phases which precede its
stabilization, and at each phase, the subtle inner micro-gestures
that we perform to elicit, stabilize, recognize, evaluate, rule out,
or enrich this image. Becoming aware of this microdynamics
requires a particular mode of attention, which is both unfo-
cused, diffuse, receptive, and very acute, sensitive to the most
subtle discontinuities. Performing this reorientation of attention
is a skill which can be learnt. This inner act may also be trig-
gered by an expert interviewer, in the context of an “elicitation
interview,” through relevant prompts and questions (Vermersch,
1994/2011; Petitmengin, 2006). The structure of an elicitation
interview is an iterative structure which consists of helping sub-
jects to evoke the experience to be described several times,
while guiding their attention toward a diachronic mesh which
is finer each time, until the required level of detail is reached.
For example, after encouraging an epileptic patient to retrieve
the circumstances of her last seizure, I led her to describe in
detail the sequence of this experience. Here is a short excerpt of
interview:
• At that point I get off my bike.
• Why do you get off your bike?
• (Silence . . .) I know that I’m about to have a seizure.
• Take the time to go back to that moment. . . At that moment,
how do you know that you’re about to have a seizure?
• (Silence. . .) Because I feel this sensation in my chest. . .
• Because you feel this sensation in your chest. When you feel
this sensation, what do you feel?
• (Silence. . .) It’s a sensation of compression.
• I would like you to go back to the moment when you are still
on your bike, before getting off. How does this sensation of
compression appear?
• (Silence. . .) In fact, progressively. It rises from my stomach to
my head.
• Could you come back to the moment when the sensation is at
the level of your stomach? When does it appear exactly? How is
it like? How big is it?
And so on. The same type of questioning can be used to obtain the
microdynamic description of actions, whether physical actions or
inner acts. For example, here is a brief extract of the interview of
a meditator:
• At that moment I am in a kind of availability, of expectation,
and also a kind of curiosity, lucidity, I am present . . .
• How do you know that you are present?
• I am not in my head anymore, I am listening with my whole
body.
• How do you go about listening with your whole body?
• First, I’m going to place my consciousness much more toward
the back of my skull.
• How do you go about placing your consciousness toward the
back of your skull?
This interview method has been used extensively to collect
detailed descriptions of unnoticed microdynamics in many
cognitive and clinical domains. For example loosening the atten-
tional focus on the content of an idea (for example a sci-
entific idea concept) makes it possible to discover a process
of maturation, and micro-adjustments of attention facilitating
the progressive transformation of a fuzzy and blurred feel-
ing into a “clear and distinct” idea (Petitmengin, 1999, 2007;
Remillieux, in press): in other words, an invisible microgen-
esis, of which the idea is only the visible result. Elicitation
methods also allow precise descriptions of the microdynam-
ics of decision processes, usually concealed by the absorption
of attention into the outcome of the process (Petitmengin
et al., 2013). In the clinical domain, in-depth elicitation inter-
views have enabled epileptic patients to become aware of
early signs announcing the arrival of an epileptic seizure,
although seizures were considered previously as unpredictable.
This confirms on the experiential level what has already been
discovered on the neuronal level (Martinerie et al., 1998):
that seizures do not arise “like a bolt in the blue,” but are
the visible result of a process that has started long before.
Importantly, the awareness of this microgenesis is the key
to new therapies for epilepsy, whose results are often better
than those of the most efficient pharmacological treatments
(Petitmengin et al., 2006): this clearly highlights the therapeu-
tic stake of becoming aware of the microdynamics of lived
experience.
Elicitation methods allow very fine-grained descriptions of the
experiential microdynamics: subtle adjustments of the orienta-
tion, scope, source, and intensity of attention, rapid succession
of micro-operations of comparison, evaluation, verification, fine
variations of emotional states, and so on. This work makes
it possible to detect the dynamics of appearance of phenome-
nal dimensions which are usually experienced as an inseparable
whole, such as the different sensorial dimensions (visual, audi-
tory, tactile, and olfactory) of an imagined scene or a perceptive
illusion. For example, while the phenomenological descriptions
of the well-known “rubber hand illusion” usually focus on the
final illusion (a rubber hand is felt as if it was one’s own hand),
elicitation techniques enable the description of the genesis of this
illusion (Valenzuela et al., 2013). With the help of these tech-
niques, several subjects described the successive transfer from the
real hand to the rubber hand of two dimensions of tactile expe-
rience which are usually felt as inseparable, the “touching” and
the “touched” dimensions (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). A careful work
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of elicitation allows access to even earlier phases of the micro-
genetic process, which seem to share common characteristics
(Petitmengin, 2007):
• fuzzy feelings which do not fall within a particular sensorial
modality, but have “transmodal” submodalities (such as inten-
sity and rhythm)—submodalities which are not specific to a
particular sense, but transposable from one sense to another1.
• an alteration of the sense of agency, under the form of an
absence of control over the cognitive event which emerges;
• an alteration of the sense of ownership: the idea, the
sensation. . . is not felt as being immediately mine, it is not felt
as personal.
The “temporal granularity” of microgenetic descriptions is also
very fine. For example, we collected detailed descriptions of the
various micro-actions involved in choice processes lasting for
1 or 2 s (Petitmengin et al., 2013), or in auditory perceptions
lasting for less than a second (Petitmengin et al., 2009). We esti-
mate that elicitation techniques provide access to micro-actions
of one-quarter of a second, which is the typical duration of a
perception-action cycle (see Jung et al., 2008, for a measure of
that duration during reading).
Once microdescriptions of singular experiences have been col-
lected, the second part of the work consists in analyzing them
in order to identify possible regularities. Each time we analyzed
a corpus of experiential descriptions, even if the content of the
experiences was very different, we were able to detect generic
microdynamic structures (Petitmengin et al., 2009, 2013). For
example, even if the content of the ideas which we explored the
genesis of was very different, we discovered a generic structure
of this genesis (Petitmengin, 1999, 2007). The very existence of
these structures has an important epistemological consequence:
it enables the production of results which are reproducible and
therefore verifiable.
INVESTIGATING NEURONAL MICRODYNAMICS
The development of experiential microdynamics has been par-
alleled by recent advances in the study of the neural micrody-
namics supporting human cognition. At the end of the 1990’s,
two research groups (Crone et al., 1998; Lachaux et al., 2000)
claimed that neural processing underlying cognition could be
mapped with very high spatial and temporal precision, and
very high signal-to-noise ratio, from the high-frequency compo-
nents of intracerebral EEG recordings obtained in the brain of
epileptic patients (Gamma-Band Activity or GBA, between 40
and 150Hz). Since then, an ever increasing number of studies
have confirmed that GBA is a general index of neural pro-
cessing in the human brain (provided some well-established
guidelines to avoid any interpretation bias due to epilepsy)
(Lachaux et al., 2012): in short, whenever a neural population
gets recruited for a cognitive process, GBA recorded in its vicin-
ity increases, for the duration of the process (Lachaux et al.,
2012).
1Unlike, for example, temperature and texture, which are specific to touch, or
color, which is specific to sight.
The main consequence of this discovery was that it was now
possible to map the fine neural dynamics of human cognition
with both millimetric and millisecond precision—a feat impos-
sible so far. We argue that this discovery has profound influence
on our understanding of human cognition in general, and on
any attempt to combine neural and experiential micro-dynamics,
because of four characteristics of this approach (intracranial
Gamma-Band Mapping, or iGBM).
FINE TIME RESOLUTION
iGBM measures neuronal activity rapidly enough (millisecond
resolution) to enable the fast mental processes revealed by the
elicitation method to be related to changes in the neural signal.
This would not be possible with fMRI, for instance, whose time
resolution is too slow to capture the subsecond microdynamics of
experience, as it can occurs for instance during reading, or visual
exploration, two processes paced by several saccades per second.
FINE SPATIAL RESOLUTION
iGBMmeasures neuronal activity with a spatial resolution equiv-
alent to fMRI, a few cubic millimeters (Lachaux et al., 2003),
which is roughly the grain of the modular organization of the
human cortex. Within such volume, neural populations tend
to share the same function (e.g., word-form recognition, music
perception, etc.). In contrast, fast non-invasive measures such
as Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography
(MEG), have much lower spatial resolution and average together
neural signals from regions with very heterogeneous functions,
making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to relate them to
the precise cognitive operations revealed by experiential micro-
dynamics. Of course, intracranial EEG recordings, and their high
spatio-temporal resolution, can only be obtained in patients,
mostly suffering from epilepsy (implantations in other neurolog-
ical diseases are restricted to very specific brain regions). This
is a limitation of every iEEG study and the “price to pay” for
such recordings, which has been debated for years (see Lachaux
et al., 2012). In a sense, the brain of those patients is always
considered to be a model of normal, healthy, brains. The usual
guideline is to present data that are reproducible across patients
with different epileptogenic networks, and with normal or close
to normal behavior (especially in cognitive tasks: performance
close to normal). Following such guidelines, we have repeat-
edly reported functional networks in epileptic patients whose
anatomical organization is fully compatible with fMRI data
observed in normal subjects (Jung et al., 2008; Bastin et al.,
2012).
SINGLE-TRIAL PRECISION LEVEL
Because intracranial electrodes record directly within neural
structures, the signal-to-noise ratio of the signals does not need
to be improved through averaging procedures (i.e., averaging sig-
nals recorded across multiple repetitions of the same cognitive
situation), as is always the case with classic human brain mea-
sures. iGBM provides therefore a direct picture of the neural
dynamics of singular, unique experiences, in single individu-
als. This is crucial for our project, whose objective is not to
match generic experiential structures, in which the specifici-
ties of individual experiences would be erased, with generic
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neural signatures, in which deviations would be eliminated as
noise, but singular experiences with their specific neural corre-
lates. Of course, the goal is to detect patterns, but it is only in
a second stage, from the analysis of singular experiences that
generic structures are searched for at the experiential and neural
levels.
In fact, the signal-to-noise ratio of iGBM signals is so good
that it raises new problems in human cognitive neuroscience: the
trial-to-trial variability it reveals in neural processing cannot be
interpreted without finer information about the succession of
cognitive operations the participant is performing, in each trial.
We observed for instance that when participants have to remem-
ber a list of letters, neural processing in the working memory
network is not continuous in single-trials (unpublished data).
Averaging across trials averages out such discontinuity and gives
an illusion that neural activity is maintained throughout the
maintenance period, which is simply not true at the single-trial
level. However, the experimental design itself does not provide
sufficient information to understand the reasons for these dis-
continuities, which might simply be the coming-and-going of the
memory trace. Only a fine analysis of the dynamics of the sub-
ject’s experience could provide an answer. During reading also,
single-trial analysis reveals that the activation of the phonolog-
ical system (including the auditory cortex) by written words is
far from systematic (Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2012), while an
average picture would hide that reality. Is it that participants
do not systematically pronounce words mentally as they read
them? Even when the phonological system is active, iGBM reveals
neural processing in secondary auditory cortical areas special-
ized for speech-perception. However, is this the correlate of the
phenomenal experience which dominates reading that is, the con-
version of a written form into a mental sound? Only a detailed
investigation of the first-person experiential dynamics of “what
it is like to read,” at the single-trial level, could provide the
answer. There are practical ways to do this; in the study above
for instance, we observed a variable lag between neural process-
ing in visual areas (first) and auditory areas (second), ranging
between 400 and 800ms. This raises the possibility that this lag
might be correlated, on a trial-to-trial basis, with the phenome-
nal experience of a decoupling between the visual and auditory
components of reading, with an actual report reflecting a variable
time-lag between the two. Such new questions and hypotheses
are extremely hard to tackle using standard experimental design
and without a finer description of what the participant is actually
doing and experiencing at the single trial level.
Brain TV
The unique properties of iGBM have been combined into a new
system pushing the approach even further, BrainTV (Lachaux
et al., 2007b; www.braintv.org). BrainTV is simply a device for
analyzing iEEG signals in real-time to provide feedback to the
participants and experimenters about the amount of neural pro-
cessing performed by a focal brain region, online. The region
is freely chosen among all implanted cortical sites (typically
100–200), which can include high-order sensory, motor, lim-
bic, associative, or executive cortex. The novelty of the approach
is twofold: first, the fine dynamics of neural processing can be
monitored in real-life situations, as the patient freely interacts
with his environment, in sharp contrast with the strong con-
straints of neuroimaging; second, patients can actively participate
in the research process, joining the research team to identify cor-
relations between their brain activity and fine, private aspects
of their ongoing experience, invisible to the experimenters. One
important feature of BrainTV is that it continuously displays
the time-course of neural activity over the last 10 s, so that par-
ticipants are not required to divide their attention between the
display and their mental processes. The investigation is sequential
rather than parallel. BrainTV was recently used in an experi-
ment requiring a patient to perform mental imagery (Hamamé
et al., 2012). There is no such thing as mental imagery—the
ability to create and maintain a mental visual image—without
phenomenal experience. Therefore, how is it possible to iden-
tify the neural correlates of mental imagery, given that this
phenomenal experience is accessible to the subject only, by def-
inition? BrainTV solves that problem by providing the subject
with an immediate feedback of his brain activity (as an image
or as a sound). This provides a direct way to combine first-
person, subjective and third person, objective data in one single
locus, the subject’s mind, and allow a comparison process, to
detect possible correlations. This comparison task, which requires
that the subject has a sharp awareness of the dynamics of his
experience, is in our approach highly facilitated by the use of
elicitation interviews, which enable even untrained subjects to
acquire fine-grained consciousness of their experience during
a given slice of time. In a sense, BrainTV shares similarities
with real-time fMRI, considering recent evidence by our group
and others (see Lachaux et al., 2007a) that the BOLD signal is
strongly correlated with gamma-band activity. The main differ-
ence is obviously that fMRI can be used to monitor any brain
region in healthy subjects, including meditators (see Garrison
et al., 2013) who are trained in introspecting. While iGBM
can only be applied in patients, but with a much higher time-
resolution and better signal-to-noise ratio, the lack of introspec-
tive skill being counterbalanced by the use of interviews. We
believe that the two approaches are complementary and should
mutually enlighten each other in the future (Lachaux et al.,
2007b).
One characteristic of BrainTV is that it not only enables the
subject to identify the neural correlates of subtle variations of
the phenomenal aspects of a mental image (such as its inten-
sity or localization); but also, by giving him a real time picture
of his brain microdynamics, it draws his attention toward sub-
tle modulations of his experience he is not usually aware of.
We used that approach to show that Gamma-Band Activity in
the Inferior Temporal Gyrus is highly correlated with the vivid-
ness of a mental image (Hamamé et al., 2012). The next step is
to provide in addition online measures of functional connectiv-
ity, considering the acknowledged importance of long-distance
neural interactions for cognition (Varela et al., 2001). We are
currently conducting the first studies of that kind, with a mea-
sure of connectivity based on amplitude-amplitude coupling
in the gamma range, following recent (offline) evidence that
such coupling is modulated by cognitive activity (Vidal et al.,
2012).
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One critical question is whether participants can find traces
in their subjective experience of any change in neural activity
(as quantified by local GBA or long-range GBA correlations),
recorded in any cortical region. Are there regions “hidden”
to subjective experience? Only elicitation sessions designed to
probe the correlation between subjective experience and the
fluctuations of neural activity can answer that long-lasting ques-
tion, directly related to the issue of the neural correlates of
consciousness.
CONCLUSION
New methods enable us to collect descriptions of neural and
experiential dynamics at a fine level of granularity that seems to
be the right level to search for correlations. By unfolding these
microdynamics, these methods provide access to early and usually
invisible stages of our cognitive processes, where the distinction
between the sensorial modalities, and between the “subject” and
“object” poles seems to be less rigid than in later stages. We
hypothesize that these early stages give us a glimpse on the pro-
cess of co-constitution of subject and object, knower and known
that is called “enaction” (Varela et al., 1991; Lutz and Thompson,
2003). Therefore, the twofoldmicrodynamic approach that we are
advocating would not only provide a methodological solution to
the problems of correlation between experiential and neuronal,
first-person and third-person descriptions of our cognitive pro-
cesses. It would also open a line of investigation into the very
cognitive acts in which the scission between the objective and the
subjective worlds originates, and a means to verify and refine the
dynamic epistemology of enaction.
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